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Greer: Measuring the Value of Information in Consumer Credit Screening

Various types of pointing systems have been devel
oped
be used in evaluating credit applications.
This article suggests—and outlines—a further refine
ment: a mathematical guide to the relative profitabil
ity of gaining more information about each credit
applicant—

MEASURING THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
IN CONSUMER CREDIT SCREENING
by Carl C. Greer
Columbia University

to grant or refuse
ing credit applicants.1 It is possible,
credit is a vital one for mail
however, to go further
extend
order retailers, consumer financethe credit profitability analysis to
companies, and other businesses
include the desirability of investing
engaged in mass consumer credit
in additional information about the
applicant. A model2 for
pur
operations. Extension of credit to

pose
is
developed
in
this
article.
someone who does not pay results
in a direct loss to the creditor. Re
fusal of credit to someone who
would pay results in the loss of a
1This technique has been discussed pre
profitable sale or
viously in Management Services. See
In recent years various statistical
Discriminant Analysis” by Sidney I.
techniques have been applied to
Neuwirth and Michael Shegda, MarchApril, ’64, p. 28, and “Credit Analysis:
make the credit screening process
An
Approach” by Robert A. Morris,
more scientific. A number of or
March-April, ’66, p. 52.
ganizations have developed “point
2This study was supported by research
ing systems” (based on the use of
funds of the Graduate School of Busi
discriminant analysis) for evaluat
ness, Columbia University.
he decision

T
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The objective of screening con
sumer credit applicants is to esti
mate the expected value of ex
tending credit to an applicant. The
key unknown in determining the
expected value of accepting a
credit applicant is the probability
of his repaying if credit is extend
ed. In order to estimate
appli
cant’s probability of repayment,
companies consider such factors as
the applicant’s income; his capital
assets;
references from em
ployers, other stores, and credit
bureaus. In general, the more fac
tors that are considered the greater
is the likelihood of the creditor’s
being able to distinguish between



1







applicants who will pay and those
unnecessary reduction in profits be
expression
for7 the expected
Management Services: A Magazine of Planning, Systems, and Controls, Vol. 4The
[1967],
No. 3, Art.
who will not.
cause of (1) the purchase of re
value of accepting or rejecting a
However, since information costs
dundant information, (2) the pur
credit applicant is derived from
money and since much of the in
chase of information that does not
the
matrix shown in Table
formation used in credit screening
aid in discriminating between good
1 on page 47. The relevant states
is redundant, the crux of the credit
bad credit applicants, and (3)
of nature in Table 1’s payoff matrix
screening decision is the determi
the failure to purchase information
are that the applicant pays or
nation of what information to
that does aid in discriminating be
doesn’t pay. The strategies are
gather about an applicant before
tween good and bad credit appli
either to accept or reject the credit
accepting or rejecting him. In or
cants. Such creditors need a con
applicant. The letter “P” equals the
der to make such a determination,
ceptual framework, or model,
probability that the applicant will
the company needs to know (1)
determining the worth of informa
pay
the expression (I-P)
the profit that will be received if
tion in credit screening.
equals the probability that the ap
the customer pays, (2) the loss
This article shows how sequen
plicant will not pay. The defini
that will be incurred if
does not
tial decision3 and probability theo
tions of the other terms in the ex
repay, (3) the cost of each piece
ry can be used to develop a model
pected value equation and the re
of information, and (4) the prob
quired data for determining values
for determining the worth of infor
ability that the customer will repay
mation
the screening of consum
for these terms are shown in Ta
given certain information. Review
er credit applicants. This model
ble 1.
of the literature
the field and
In practice, companies can de
will provide optimal decision rules
interviews with several retail credit
termine values for C, D, F,
G
regarding the amount and types
managers
New York City indi
from historical data. This proce
information to process before ac
cate that many companies have not
cepting or rejecting a consumer
dure may be complicated because
determined all or even most of
credit applicant. It will also aid
some of these parameters
be
these parameters.
profit planning and in the setting
functions of P, the probability of
the customer’s paying. For exam
of bad debt reserves. The article
also uses sensitivity analysis to
ple, it is likely that
applicant
‘Eyeballing’
who has a high estimated prob
demonstrate the effects of changing
Some consumer creditors rely al
parameters in the model on the
ability of paying would also have
most exclusively on a screening
ultimate decision rules and on the
characteristics such as high current
approach called “eyeballing.” In
of information.
income that would cause him to
approach, the credit applicant
have a high expected present value
is accepted or rejected solely on
of profits from future purchases.
Description of the model
the basis of application form infor
In order to resolve
problem
mation that is evaluated subjec
Developing such a model re
interdependence, companies could
tively or by using a statistically
quires four steps. These steps are
determine values for C, D, F, and
derived scoring equation. Other
(1) the determination of an expres
G after first grouping their cus
consumer creditors require that a
sion for the expected value of ac
tomers into risk classes based on
credit bureau report be purchased
cepting or rejecting a credit appli
their estimated probability of pay
for every credit applicant. There
cant; (2) the specification of the
ment. Values for X will vary from
are more than a dozen types of
values of the parameters in the
customer to customer, and values
credit bureau reports, which can
expected value expression; (3) the
for E will depend upon the amount
cost as little as .45 cents (for a
estimation of the probability of a
and types
information gathered
short, in-file report) or as
as
credit applicant’s paying based up
about the applicant.
$3 (in the case of a special han
on the information that has been
Having determined an expression
gathered
about
him;
and
(4)
the
for the expected value of accepting
dling report).
use of sequential decision theory
or rejecting a credit applicant and
Regardless of the number of
to determine the expected value of
sources of information
by
accepting, rejecting,
getting
credit grantors, failure to specify
more information about the credit
the probability of repayment based
CARL C. GREER, Ph.D.,
applicant at each stage in the in
on information about
applicant,
is assistant professor of
formation gathering process.
the profit that will be received if
banking
and
finance
the customer pays, and the loss
that will be incurred if he does not
pay makes it impossible to calcu
late the expected value of accept
ing him. Consequently, the present
screening practices of many con
sumer credit grantors lead to an

at

Columbia

University

Graduate School of Busi

3The application of sequential analysis to
credit has been independently suggested
in the trade credit area by my colleague,
Dileep R. Mehta, in his unpublished doc
toral dissertation, The Management of
Accounts Receivable, Harvard Univer
sity, 1965.
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having
C, D,
F, and Creditscore.
Third, the company can
Greer: Measuring the
Value specified
of Information
in Consumer
Screening
the next step in developing our
purchase a credit bureau report
model is to estimate the probability
for $1 and use that information
of a credit applicant’s paying based
coupled with the score from the
upon the information that
been
application blank to estimate a
gathered about him. This estimate
new probability of payment.
can be made by sampling to find
the proportion of customers pay
Add-on orders
ing given certain information. This
A similar sequence can be adopt
proportion would be an estimate
ed for evaluating an
order
of P(Pay/I), where I equals cer
from an established credit cus
tain information. This information
could consist of credit bureau re
tomer. The only difference is the
existence of the established cus
ports, references,
a score
tomer’s payment record with the
based
using multiple regression
Assume there are three pos
company. Since determining this
or discriminant analysis4 to weight
information is virtually costless, the
the
to the application
sible stages in the informa
first stage in screening an order
blank.
The
step in developing our
from
established customer might
tion gathering process. First,
involve accepting or rejecting the
model is to
sequential decision
the retailer can accept or
theory to determine the expected
order
the basis of the customer’s
G,
value of accepting, rejecting,
payment record. Subsequent stages
reject the credit applicant on
getting more information about the
in screening might involve the pur
chasing of new credit bureau in
credit applicant at each successive
the basis of zero information.
stage in the information gathering
formation or even requiring the
Second, the company can
credit applicant to fill out a new
process.

accept or reject on the basis

of an application form that
the applicant completes and
the company uses to derive

a probability of payment

score. Third, the company
can buy a credit bureau
report and use that informa

tion together with the score
from the application blank to

estimate a new probability
of payment.

Application of the model
In order to indicate how our
model would be used in practice,
we shall apply it to the credit
screening operation of a hypotheti
cal retail company that wishes to
formulate decision rules for screen
ing the first order from new credit
applicants. Assume that this retail
creditor has three possible stages
in the information gathering proc
ess for a new credit applicant.
First, the company can accept or
reject the new credit applicant
the basis of
information. Sec
ond, the company can accept or
reject on the basis of
applica
tion form that the applicant fills
out and that costs the company
fifty cents to process. Discriminant
analysis is used by the company to
derive a score from the applicant’s
application blank, and a probabil
ity of payment is ascribed to the
4The use of multiple regression and
criminant analysis to score consumer
credit applicants is explained by James
H. Myers and Edward W. Forgy in
“The Development of Numerical Credit
Evaluation Systems, American Statisti
cal Association Journal, September, 1963.
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credit application form.
In addition to using credit appli
cation forms and a single type of
credit bureau report as sources of
information, consumer creditors
may find it profitable to evaluate
the desirability of using informa
tion in credit screening that is ob
tained from personal interviews,
purchasing several types of credit
bureau reports, checking personal
credit references, contacting em
ployers, and directly contacting
other stores in order to determine
their ledger experience with the
customer. However, since inclusion
of more than three stages of infor
mation gathering would diminish
the illustrative value of our exam
ple, we will confine our analysis to
the no information, application
form,
a single type of credit
bureau report stages. Similarly, for
illustrative
example
will be confined to the screening of
first orders from new credit appli
cants although the analytical proc
ess is identical for add-on orders
from established customers.
Company data for calculating
the values of C, D, F, and G are
summarized in Table 2
page 48.
From Table 2 we determine that
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is purchased, the credit manager
ratings
received
for 7rejected appli
C, the profit
per dollarServices:
of credit
Management
A Magazine
of Planning, Systems, and Controls, Vol.
4 [1967],
No. 3, Art.
will judge it to be either good
cants to the percentage of rejected
sales given that the customer pays,
(Rg), fair (Rf), or poor (Rp). The
equals $0.33; D, the net benefit
applicants that it estimated would
company can group past customers
pay and not pay.
per customer given that the cus
based upon credit scores
tomer pays, equals $3.48; F, the
The probability data that we
credit bureau report ratings
shall use in our example are ex
cost per dollar of credit sales giv
determine what proportion of each
en that the customer
not pay,
hibited in Tables 3, 4 and 5 on
group paid. This proportion is the
page 49
6 on page 50. These
equals $0.74; and G, the cost per
estimate of an applicant’s paying
tables also show the relationship
credit customer given that the cus
given certain information. Since
between the discriminatory power
tomer does not pay, equals $0.50.
In order to avoid complicating our
some applicants were rejected in
of the application blank scores and
the past, the company must be
the credit bureau reports. The
example, we shall assume that val
careful to relate application blank
ues of C, D, F, and G will be con
numbers in the tables are the joint
scores and credit bureau report
stant for all credit applicants re
probability of occurrence of the
gardless of their estimated risk
and that defaulting customers are
denied credit beyond their first or
der. Therefore, after substituting
into the expressions of Table 1, we
TABLE I
find that the expected value of
PAYOFF MATRIX
accepting a credit applicant equals
For Determining the Expected Value of Accepting or Rejecting an
PX(1.07) + P$(3.98) -0.74X Order from a Consumer Credit Applicant
$0.50-E.
Expected Value
Pays (P)
Doesn't Pay (l-P)
In order to implement our mod
Accept
(P)(X)(C+F)+P(D+G)-FX-G-E
CX+D-E
-FX-G-E
el, it is necessary to estimate the
Reject
—E
—E
—E
probability that the credit appli
Definitions of and the required data for determining values for these terms
cant will pay given a certain piece
Required Data for Determining Values of the Terms
Term
Definition
of information. At present, our
P
the probability that the
hypothetical company rejects 20
applicant will pay
per cent of all new credit appli
(l-P)
the probability that the
cants. Of those accepted, histori
applicant will not pay
cally, 90 per cent have paid. Of
X
the dollar order size
those rejected, credit bureau infor
(1) the average finance or service charge revenue
C
the profit per dollar of
mation regarding the experience
per dollar of credit sales; (2) the variable cost of
credit sales given that
of other companies with these ap
producing and selling for credit; (3) the cost of
the customera will pay
additional capital required because of credit sell
plicants indicates that 10 per cent
ing per dollar of credit sales; (4) the probability
would have paid if accepted. Let
that a credit customer who repays will be delin
ting y = all those
apply for
quent; (5) the collection cost per dollar of credit
sales to a customer who becomes delinquent
credit, 0.8y = the number of ac
cepted applicants; (0.9)(0.8y) =
parameters (2), (3), and (5) that apply to C; plus
F
the cost per dollar of
credit sales given that
(6) the variable cost of collecting from a customer
(0.72y) = the number of accepted
who defaults per dollar of credit sales; (7) the
the customer will not
applicants who pay; and (0.1)
percentage of the amount owed by customers
repay
(0.2y) = 0.02y = the number of
who default that remains uncollected
rejected applicants
would
D
the
net
benefits
(or
(8) the present value of profits from future pur
chases by a current period credit customer who
costs) per customer (op
have paid. So, the probability of
repays his debt; (9) the present value of the dif
posed to per dollar of
applicant’s paying with no in
ference between the profits from cash purchases
credit sales) given that
formation having been gathered
made by a credit customer who repaysb and the
the customer pays
profits from cash purchases that the credit
about him is 0.74 and the prob
tomer would have made had credit not been ex
ability of
applicant’s not paying
tended to him; (10) the systemic credit depart
is 0.26.
ment costs per customer
When the credit application
blanks are scored by using dis
criminant analysis, scores I1, I2 or
I3 may result. An applicant scoring
I1 has a lower probability of pay
ing than one scoring I2 and an
applicant scoring I2 has a lower
probability of paying than one
scoring I3. If a credit bureau report

May-June, 1967

G

E

parameter (10) that applies to D; plus (11) costs
associated with additional purchases that a bad

customer does not pay

customer sometimes makes before he is denied
further credit

cumulative cost of
information
the

(12) the cost of each type of information used in
credit screening

aHereafter we shall refer to an accepted credit applicant as a credit customer.
blt is assumed that a credit customer who defaults will not make cash purchases from
a store in which he defaults and would not have bought for cash if he had been
refused credit.
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the cost per credit cus
tomer given that the

47

4

Greer: Measuring the Value of Information in Consumer Credit
(noScreening
pay/certain information) we
can determine the expected value
Type of Data
Value
of accepting or rejecting a credit
Service charge revenue per dollar of credit sales
$0,055
applicant given “certain informa
The variable cost of goods sold per dollar of credit sales
0.67
tion.” In Table 7, on page 51, we
The cost of capital invested in accounts receivable per dollar of
show the P( pay/certain informa
credit sales*
$0,034
tion), the P(no pay/certain infor
The cost of capital invested in other assets (besides accounts re
mation), the expected value of ac
Data for Calculating the Values of the Parameters in the Expected Value Equation

ceivable) required because of credit selling per dollar of credit sales

$0.01

The probability that a credit customer who repays will be delinquent

0.33

The cost of collection from a delinquent credit customer per dollar
of credit sales

$0.03

The variable cost of collecting from a defaulted customer

0

The percentage of the amount owed by defaulted customers that

100%

remains uncollected

The present value of the profit from future purchases by a current period

credit customer who repays

$6.98

The present value of the difference between the profits from cash purchases
made by a credit customer who repays and the profits from cash purchases
that the credit customer would have made had credit not been extended

Systemic credit department costs per customer

—$3.00
$0.50

*ln order to reflect the time value of money completely, we should discount to present

value each of the benefits and costs from granting credit. For ease of computation and
for clarity in describing our model, we have approximately accounted for the time

cepting given that information, and
the expected value of rejecting
given that information.
From the data in Tables 6 and
7 we can construct the decision
tree shown in the figure on page
This decision tree shows the
expected value of the various de
cision choices facing the company.
The numbers in parentheses
the figure represent the probabili
ties of receiving the adjacent in
formation and are computed from
Table 5.

value of money through the term "the cost of capital invested in accounts receivable."

Evaluating ‘more info.’
TABLE 2

events represented by the intersec
tion of the rows and columns. The
numbers in the margins are the
probabilities of occurrence of the
that they are opposite.
The data shown in Tables 3-6
can be obtained through sampling
and the use of the formula for
conditional probability. For exam
ple, to derive Table 3, the company
could take a sample of bad cus
tomers (adjusted for rejected ap
plicants) and determine what per
centage scored I1, I2, and I3. These
percentages would be estimates of
P(Ik/bad) where k = 1, 2, 3. From
the definition of conditional prob
ability
know that P(Ik/bad) =
P(Ik/bad) ÷ P(bad) and P(Ik/
good) = P(Ik/good) ÷ P(good)
we can therefore calculate the
values of the entries in Table 3,
i.e., P(Ik/bad) and P(Ik/good).
The same procedure could be used
to determine the entries in Tables
4, 5,
6.
The entries in Tables 3, 4, and
5 are related to the entries in Ta
ble 6. For example, the sum of
48
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(Rg,I3,G) + (Rg,I2,G) + (Rg,I1,G)
in Table 6 equals the value of
(Rg,G) in Table 4; the sum of
(I1,Rg,G) + (I1,Rf,G) + (I1,Rp,G)
in Table 6 equals the value of
(I1,G) in Table 3; the sum of
(Rg,I3) + (Rg,I2) + (Rg,I1) in
Table 6 equals the value for Rg in
Table 5, etc.
Using the equation for condition
al probability in conjunction with
the data in Tables 3 and 6, we
can determine the P( pay/certain
information) and the P(no pay/
certain information).5 Knowing P
(pay/certain information) and P
5As an alternative to constructing Tables
3 and 6, Bayes’ Theorem could be used
to estimate the P( pay/certain informa
tion). For example, P(pay/I ) = P
(pay/no information) • P(I3/pay) -4[P(pay/no information) • P(I3/pay) +
P(I3/no pay) • P(no pay/no informa
tion)].
For the sake of clarity and because
we shall have other uses for the data
shown in Tables 3 and 6, we have chosen
to determine the P( pay/certain informa
tion) from the tables rather than from
Bayes’ theorem.

Working from the bottom of the
decision tree toward the top, we
determine the worth of the alterna
tive “more info.” by multiplying
the probability of receiving a par
ticular piece of information times
the payoff from the best strategy
given the information. For exam
ple, if I3 is the score derived from
an applicant’s credit application
form, in order to evaluate the
worth of the alternative “more
info.” we calculate the sum of the
following: the probability of Rg
occurring times the payoff from
the best strategy given Rg plus the
probability of Rf occurring times
the payoff from the best strategy
given Rf plus the probability of Rp
occurring times the payoff from the
best strategy given Rp. Therefore,
the expected value of “more info.”
if the applicant scored I3 is (0.53)
(0.31X + 1.90) + (0.32) (0.26X
+ 1.70) + (0.15) (0.18 + 1.42)
= 0.27X + 1.76.
We have placed the expected
value of additional information be
side the strategy designated “more
info.” Note that in some cases the
equation for the expected value of
“more info.” depends upon the size
of the applicant’s credit order. This
result occurs because the relative

Management Services

5

Services:
A Magazine
Planning, Systems,
4 Probabilistic
[1967], No.Relationships
3, Art. 7 Between Credit
The
$0.5 of[0.16(40)
+ 1.34]and
= Controls,
$5.77 Vol.
desirability Management
of the accept
versus
Application Blank Scores and Payment
per credit applicant.
reject strategies may depend upon
Proceeding in a similar fashion,
the
of X. For example, in the
Doesn't Pay
Pays
we find that the expected value of
branch of the tree for Rp given I2
0.444
0.026
0.47
the strategy “accept all credit ap
the strategy accept is more desir
I2
0.222
0.078
0.30
plicants on the basis of zero in
able than the strategy reject for
I1
0.074
0.156
0.23
all X<$8.72. However, for X>
formation” equals $3.79 per credit
1
0.74
0.26
applicant. The incremental worth
$8.72, the strategy reject is more
of the optimal strategy relative to
desirable. Therefore, the worth of
TABLE 3
“more info.” given I2 is designated
this one is +$1.98 per credit ap
by one equation for X<$8.72 and
plicant.
one equation for X>$8.72.
The expected value of the strat
The Probabilistic Relationships Between Credit
Bureau Reports and Payment
egy “process
application blank
for each credit applicant and then
Doesn't Pay
Pays
Decision rules
accept or reject” equals $5.53 per
0.41
0.04
Rg
0.37
Analyzing the decision tree, we
credit applicant. The incremental
0.35
Rf
0.09
0.26
find that the retail company should
0.24
worth of the optimal strategy rela
Rp
0.11
0.13
accept all first orders for
than
tive to this one is +$0.24 per cred
1
0.26
.74
or equal to $7.66 without obtain
it applicant.
ing any information about the cred
The expected value of the strat
TABLE 4
it applicant. For orders greater
egy “process
application blank
than $7.66, the credit applicant
and buy a credit bureau report for
size distribution of orders shown
should be required to fill out a
each credit applicant and then ac
in
Table 8, this expected value per
credit application form. Applicants
cept or reject” equals $4.98 per
credit
applicant equals $9.15. This
scoring I1 should be rejected. If the
credit applicant. The incremental
is
$3.38
greater than the expected
applicant scores I2 and
order
worth of the optimal policy rela
value
of
the optimum policy the
is $28 or below,
order should
tive to this one is $0.79 per credit
company
now
follows based on the
be accepted. However, if
order
applicant.
information
presently
used. This
is greater than $28, a credit bu
For
company, the preceding
means
that
the
company
could af
reau report should be purchased.
calculations indicate that neither a
ford
to
spend
up
to
$3.38
for ad
If the applicant receives a good
policy of “eyeballing” all credit
ditional
information
per
credit
ap
(Rg) or fair (Rf) credit bureau re
applicants nor purchasing credit
plicant if it felt that such informa
port, his order should be accepted.
bureau reports for all applicants
tion would allow it to distinguish
If he receives a poor (Rp) credit
will be as successful as following
perfectly between applicants who
bureau report, his order should be
a sequential strategy involving ac
would and who would not pay.
rejected. Applicants scoring I3
cepting some applicants immedi
If the company could adopt
should be accepted.
ately, some
the basis of the
some procedure that would ensure
If the company knew the
application blank, and some after
that all applicants would pay, e.g.,
distribution of first orders from
purchasing a credit bureau report.
change its collection policy, the ex
new credit applicants it could de
If the company had perfect in
pected
value per applicant would
termine the expected dollar value
formation, i.e., it knew which ap
equal
$12.37.
This expected value
per applicant of the optimal strat
plicants would pay and which
is
$6.60
greater
than the expected
egy, the strategy “accept all credit
would not, the expected value per
value
of
the
optimum
policy now
applicants on the basis of
in
credit applicant would equal
followed
based
on
the
information
formation,” and the strategy “proc
0.244X
$2.58. Based upon the
ess an application blank and buy
a credit bureau report for each
credit applicant and then accept
or reject.”
For example, assume that Table
TABLE 5
8 on page 54 contains the size
The Probabilistic Relationships Between Credit Application
distribution of orders from new
Blank Scores and Credit Bureau Reports
credit applicants. Based on Table
8 and the figure
page 53, the
Rp
Rg
expected value of the optimal strat
I3
0.25
0.15
0.07
0.47
egy equals $0.05 [0.05(1)+2.44]
I2
0.11
0.11
0.08
0.30
+ $0.05 [(4) + 2.44] + $0.05 [0.05
I1
0.05
0.09
0.09
0.23
(6) 4- 2.44] 4- $0.05 [0.14(8) +
0.41
0.24
1
0.35
1.75] + $0.3 [0.14(20) + 1.75] +
May-June, 1967
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtservices/vol4/iss3/7
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In addition to aiding a company in determining optimum credit screening policy. ..

TABLE 6
The Probabilistic Relationships Between Credit Application
Blank Scores, Credit Bureau Reports, and Payment

Pays

Doesn't Pay

Rg,I3

0.244

0.006

2

0.100

0.010

0.11

Rg,I1

0.026

0.024

0.05

Rf,l3

0.140

0.010

0.15

Rf,I2

0.080

0.030

0.11

Rf,I1

0.040

0.050

0.09

0.060

0.010

0.07

Rp,I2

0.042

0.038

0.08

Rp,I1

0.0080

0.082

0.09

R

0.74

0.26

0.25

1

In addition to aiding a company
in determining optimum credit
screening policy, the information
shown in the decision tree can also
aid in profit planning and in con
trolling costs associated with credit
granting. For example, assume
that the company has 1,000 new
credit applicants per month. Of
these 1,000 applicants, 150 will
be accepted without processing
information about them. Of
these 150, 50 have average order
sizes of $1, 50 have average order
sizes of $4, and 50 have average
order sizes of
So total sales to
this group equals $550. Net ac
counting profit6 equals $47.50.

Information should be gathered
for 850 of the 1,000 credit appli
cants. Of the 850, 400 will score
I3 and be accepted. For this group,
24 have an average order size of
$8,
have
average order size
of $20,
235 have
average
order size of $40. Total sales to
those applicants scoring I3 equal
$12,412. Net accounting profit
equals $2,951.24, bad debt expenses
equal $744.72, credit screening
costs equal $200,
24 applicants
default.
Of the 850 credit applicants for
whom more information is gath
ered, 255 score I2. Of these, 105
are accepted without the pur
chase of a credit bureau report.
The average size of orders from
these 105 is $18.29. The remaining
150 require the purchase of credit
bureau reports. The average order
size from these is
The total
value of orders from those scoring
I2 is $7,920.45, net accounting prof
it equals $305.65, bad debt ex-

6 Net accounting profit reflects deductions
for bad debt expenses and credit screen
ing costs. Net accounting profit does not
include the present value of future profits
and the foregone profits from cash sales
attributable to credit selling. When these
two parameters are removed from the
expected value equation, we
that

the equation for net accounting profits
equals 1.07PX-0.74X-$0.5-E. While con
sideration of the present value of future
profits and the foregone profits from
cash sales is necessary for determining
the optimum procedure to use in credit
screening, they
not be included
when calculating net accounting profit.

presently used and the existing
collection policy. The $6.60 repre
sents the maximum amount that the
company could afford to spend
per applicant to make payment
certain.

Forecasting and planning
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penses equal $1,302.12, credit
screening costs equal $277.50, and
47 customers default. Thirty-nine
of those scoring I2 are rejected up
on receipt of a bad credit bureau
report. The total dollar value of
orders from these 39 credit appli
cants equals $1,560.
Of the 850 credit applicants for
whom more information is gath
ered, 195 score I1, and are rejected.
The total dollar value of orders
from this
equals $6,056.70,
and the cost of screening equals
$97.50.
For each 1,000 credit applicants,
company can expect the total
value of orders to equal $26,939.15,
the dollar value of rejected credit
orders to equal $7,616.70 or 28.27
per cent of
amount, and the
dollar value of credit sales to equal
$19,322.45. Total accounting profit
will equal $3,209.39, bad debt ex
penses will equal $2,189.34 or 11.33
per cent of credit sales, cost of
processing credit application blanks
will equal $425, cost of credit
bureau reports will equal $150, and
110 customers may be expected to
default.

Basis of rejection
Two hundred thirty-four of each
1,000 credit applicants will be re
jected. Of these, 39 will be reject
ed as a result of information de
termined from the credit bureau
reports, and 195 will be rejected
on the basis of application form
information. Seven hundred sixtysix of each 1,000 credit applicants
will be accepted. Of these, 150
will be accepted on the basis of
information, 505 will be ac
cepted
the basis of the appli
cation form, and 111 will be ac
cepted
the basis of the credit
bureau report.
Knowing these values per 1,000
new credit applicants, the company
can set control standards for new
credit applicants. By estimating the
Management Services 7
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expected number of new credit
applicants in future periods, the
company can derive a budget ap
plicable to new credit applicants.
By repeating the analytical proc

ess for add-on-orders from estab
lished customers, screening deci
sion rules, control standards, and
budgets can be set for
cus
tomers as well.

Sensitivity analysis
The validity of credit screening
decision rules, control standards,
and budgets depends upon the
continuation of past relationships
into the future. Changes in the
equations for the expected value
of economic and accounting profit,
the probability of default given no
information, the cost of informa
tion,
the relative discrimina
tory power of the stages used in
credit screening will affect the de
cision rules and the profit meas
In addition, changes in the
size distribution of orders, while
not affecting the decision rules,
will affect the magnitude of the
benefits and costs from credit sell
ing.
In order to show the sensitivity
of optimum decision rules and of
the worth of information to
changes in certain parameters, we
shall recalculate the worth of in
formation and decision rules when
each of the following changes oc
curs: (1) the variable cost percent
age of producing and seling goods
for credit changes from 0.67 to
0.85, (2) the cost of credit bureau
reports rises from
to $2, (3)
the probability of default given
information falls from 0.26 to 0.09,
and (4) the credit application
stage becomes less discriminatory
relative to the credit bureau re
port stage. Finally, we shall show
how changes in the size distribu
tion of orders can affect the dollar
value of the worth of information
the number of customers that

are accepted or rejected at a par
ticular stage of information gath
ering.

Equation changes with cost
When analyzing the effects of a
change in the variable cost per
centage of producing and selling
for credit, we assume that the
probabilistic relationships shown in
Tables 3-6 still hold but derive a
new equation for the expected val
ue of accepting a credit applicant.
If the variable cost percentage
producing and selling goods for
credit changes from 67 per cent to
85 per cent, the equation for the
expected value of accepting a cred
it applicant changes from P(X)
1.07 + $3.98P-0.74X - $0.50 - E
to PX(1.07) + P($1.49) - 0.93X
— $.50 — E. After constructing a
new decision tree,
find that the
new decision rules are these: Ac
cept all credit applicants whose
orders are $3.57 or less on the
basis of zero information. If an
order is greater than $3.57, have
the applicant fill out
application
form. An applicant scoring I1
should be rejected. If he scores I2
and his order is $4.28 or less, ac

TABLE 7
The Conditional Probabilities of an Applicant's Paying or Not Paying and the Expected Values

of Accepting or Rejecting an Applicant Given Certain Information

Information

Exp. Val. of Acc.

Exp. Val. of Rej.

P(pay/info.)

P(no pay/info.)

Given the Info.

Given the Info.

0

0.74

0.26

0.05X+2.44

I3

0.94

0.06

0.27X+2.74

I2

0.74

0.26

0.05X+1.94

— $ .50

1

0.32

0.68

— 0.04X+0.27

— $ .50

Rg,I3

0.98

0.02

0.31X4-1.90

— $1.50

Rg,l2

0.91

0.09

0.23X4-1.62

— $1.50

Given



0

— $ .50

Rg,I1

0.52

0.48

-0.18X+0.07

— $1.50

Rf,I3

0.93

0.07

0.26X+1.70

— $1.50

Rf,l2

0.73

0.27

0.04X+0.91

-$1.50

Rf,I1

0.44

0.56

— 0.27X —0.25

-$1.50

Rp,I3

0.86

0.14

-0.18X4-1.42

— $1.50

Rp,I2

0.52

0.48

-0.18X+0.07

— $1.50

R ,I1

0.09

0.91

— 0.64X—1.64

-$1.50
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cept him. If he scores I2 and his
order is greater than $4.28 but less
than or equal to $68, reject him.
If he scores I2 and
order is
greater than $68, buy a credit bur
eau report. If he
a good (Rg)
credit bureau report, accept him.
If he has a fair (Rf) or poor (Rp)
credit bureau report, reject him.
If he scores I3 and his order is $111
or less, accept him. If he scores I3
and
order is greater than $111,
buy a credit bureau report. If he
has a good (Rg) or fair (Rf)
credit bureau report, accept him.
If, on the other hand, he has a poor
(Rp) credit bureau report, reject
him.
As a result of this increase in
the variable cost percentage of
goods produced and sold for cred
it, more applicants are required to
fill out application forms prior to
acceptance. The effect on the re
quired number of credit bureau
reports depends upon the size dis
tribution of orders larger than
More credit applicants are reject
ed, and the expected value of the
strategy “more info.” given no in
formation is
However, the
incremental value of “more info.”
compared to the strategy accept

51
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Information
Consumer
Screening
all Value
creditof
applicants
on in
the
basis of Credit
equation
for the expected value of
information is increased. Simi
accepting
the probabilistic re
lar results would ensue from assum
lationships shown in Table 5 still
ing that defaulting credit custo
apply but that changes occur in
mers make other purchases besides
Tables 3, 4,
6. If the nature
their initial order before they are
of the store’s clientele changes so
cut off from all further credit. In
that the expected proportion of
such cases, the expected loss per
applicants that default given
customer that defaults would be
information changes from 0.26 to
higher than in the preceding ex
0.09, optimum decision rules based
on a new decision tree are as fol
When analyzing the effects of a
lows: Accept all credit applicants,
change in the cost per credit bur
regardless of order
on the
eau report, we assume that both the
basis of zero information.

If the cost of credit bureau

reports increases, the same

number of applicants as in
the decision tree figure
zero
are required
to fill out

application forms, hut fewer
credit bureau reports

are purchased.

probabilistic relationships shown in
Tables 3-6 and the equation for
the expected value of accepting a
credit applicant still apply. If the
cost per credit bureau report in
creases from $1 to
optimum
decision rules based
a new de
cision tree are as follows: Accept
all credit applicants whose orders
are $7.66 or less on the basis of
zero information. If an order is
greater than $7.66 have the appli
cant fill out
application form.
An applicant scoring I1 should be
rejected. If he scores I2 and his
order is less than $47.80 accept
him. If he scores I2
his order
is greater than $47.80 buy a credit
bureau report. If he has a good
(Rg) or fair (Rf) credit bureau re
port accept him. If he has a poor
(Rp) credit bureau report reject
him. An applicant scoring I3 should
be accepted.
As a result of this increase in the
cost of credit bureau reports, the
same number of applicants as in
the decision tree figure are re
quired to fill out application forms
prior to acceptance, but fewer
credit bureau reports are pur
chased. More credit applicants are
accepted, but the absolute value
and the incremental value of the
strategy “more info.”
information compared to the strat
egy accept all credit applicants
based on zero information de
creases.

Changes in clientele
When analyzing the effects of a
change in the initial probability of
default, we
that both the

 

As a result of this decrease in
the probability of default given no
information, no credit applicants
are required to fill out an applica
tion form, and no credit applicants
require the additional information
contained in a credit bureau report.
Of course, each applicant would be
required to furnish enough infor
mation to facilitate the creditor’s
billing and record keeping opera
tion. All credit applicants are ac
cepted and the absolute value of
the alternative “more info.” given
no information increases.
However, the incremental ex
pected value of the strategy “more
info.” given
information de
creases when compared to the ex
pected value of the strategy ac
cept all applicants based on zero
information.

Decision tree change
When analyzing the effects of an
increase in the discriminatory pow
er of the credit bureau report stage
relative to the credit application
stage, we assume that both the
equation for the expected value of
accepting and the probabilistic re
lationships shown in Tables 4 and
5 still apply but that changes oc
cur in Tables 3 and 5. If the dis
criminatory power of the credit
application stage decreases relative
to the credit bureau report stage,
optimum decision rules based on
a new decision tree are as follows:
Accept all credit applicants whose
orders are
than or equal to
Management Services
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O"INFO.

Info."

0.05 + 2.44

X + 1.93

0.14 X + 1.75
28.00

I3 (0.47)

l2 (0.30)

Acc.
0.05 X + 1.94

Rej.
— 0.50

0.27 X + 2.74

I1 (0.23)

Rej.
— 0.50

Rej.
—

— 0.4 X +

"More Info."

"More Info."

—

X —

—

X — 1.15
* 8.72 < X
— 1.50

"More Info.'
R (0.53)

Rp(0.15)

0.10 X + 0.55

Rp (0.39)

0.05 X + 0.95
0.31 X

Rej.
— 1.50

X
+ 1.42

Rej.
1.50

-0.18 X
+

Rf (0.32)

0.26 X
+ 1.70

Rej.
— 1.50

— 0.64 X
— 1.64

Rej.
— 1.50

Rf (0.39)

Reg.
— 1.50

-0.27 X
— 0.25

Rp (0.26)

Rg (0.37)

Rej.
— 1.50

0.23 X
+ 1.62

Rej.
— 1.50

-0.18 X
+ 0.07

Rej.
1.50

R (0.37)

Rej.
— 1.50

X
+ 0.91

Decision Tree

For Use in Setting Optimal Credit Screening Policy
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The Size
of Orders from
New Credit Credit
Applicants
Greer: Measuring
the Distribution
Value of Information
in Consumer
Screening
Where X Equals the Size of the Order

Order Size

Per Cent of Orders

0<X≤1.92

1.92<X≤4.63

$ 1.00
5

4.63<X≤7.66

7.66<X≤8.72
8.72<X≤28.00
X>28.00

Average Value

4.00
6.00

5

8.00

30
50

20.00

40.00

TABLE 8

$24.60
the basis of zero infor
mation. If an order is greater than
$24.60, have the applicant fill out
an application blank. If the appli
cant scores I1, purchase a credit
bureau report. If the credit bureau
report is good (Rg), accept the
applicant; if the credit bureau re
port is poor (Rp), reject him. If
the credit bureau report is fair
(Rf), accept the applicant if his
order is less than or equal to
$108.50
reject him if his order
is greater than $108.50. If the ap
plicant scores I2, purchase a credit
bureau report. If the credit bureau
report is good (Rg) or fair (Rf)
the applicant should be accepted;
if the credit bureau report is poor
(Rp), the applicant should be re
jected. If the applicant scores I3
and his order is less than or equal
to $61.50, accept him. If the appli
cant scores I3
his order is
greater than $61.50 purchase a
credit bureau report. If the credit
bureau report is good (Rg) or fair
(Rf), the applicant should be ac
cepted; if the credit bureau report
is poor (Rp), the applicant should
be rejected.
As a result of this decrease in
the discriminatory power of the
credit application stage relative to
the credit bureau report stage,
fewer credit applicants are re
quired to fill out credit application
blanks prior to acceptance. How
ever, for those filling out credit
application blanks, more credit
bureau reports are purchased.
Whether or not more or fewer
credit applicants are accepted in
total depends upon the
distri
bution of incoming orders. Cer
tainly, more are accepted at the

 

size

 

Changes in order size
Finally, when analyzing the ef
fects of a change in the
distri
bution of incoming orders, we must
assume that both the equation
for the expected value of accept
ing
the probabilistic relation
ships shown in Tables 3-6 do
change.
If the average size of incoming
orders increases for each of the
ranges of order size shown
Ta
ble 8 and the percentage of small
orders decreases, the optimal deci
sion rules will not change. How
ever, for a given number of credit
applicants the expected total dollar
value of the strategy “more info.”
given no information will increase
and the expected total dollar value
of the strategy “accept”
no
information will probably decrease.
We say probably because the per
centage of orders less than $7.66
will decrease, but the average val
ue of all orders less than $7.66
will increase. Fewer applicants will
be accepted
the basis of zero
information, more will be accept
ed after scoring I3, more will be
rejected after scoring I1, more will
be accepted
the basis of scoring

I2 alone, more will be accepted on
the basis of receiving Rg/I2 and
Rf/I2, and more will be rejected on
the basis of receiving Rp/I2.

Summary
In summary, we developed a
model based
probability theory
and sequential decision theory for
determining optimal credit screen
ing procedures and the worth of
information in consumer credit
screening. After using our approach
to determine optimal credit screen
ing policy for a hypothetical retail
creditor,
reached the follow
ing conclusions:
1. Optimal policy is a function
of credit order size.
2.
model can be used to
aid in controlling credit depart
ment operations and in forecasting
accounting profits or losses from
credit granting, credit screening ex
penditures,
bad debt expenses.
3. Optimal credit screening pro
cedures and the worth of informa
tion are sensitive to changes in the
variable cost percentage of pro
ducing
selling for credit, the
cost of credit bureau reports, the
initially estimated probability of
default based on zero information,
the discriminatory power of
the credit application stage rela
tive to the credit bureau report
stage.
4. A change in the
distribu
tion of incoming orders affects the
dollar value of the expected worth
of additional information and the
number of credit applicants who
are accepted or rejected at each
stage of the credit screening proc
ess.
Management Services
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zero information stage, but fewer
are accepted at the I3, I2, I1 stages
and beyond. Based upon the size
distribution of orders shown in
Table 8, more credit applicants will
be accepted than in
initial case.
The absolute value and the incre
mental value of the strategy “more
info.” given zero information de
creases when compared with the
strategy accept all credit applicants
based on
information.
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